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*K. Keay
January 8)*

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20503

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Intelligence Community Staff

21 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Participants in Intelligence Exercise
(See Distribution)

SUBJECT: Phase I Report

REFERENCE: IC 75-1367, 4 March 1975

1. On 18 March representatives from the Offices of Current Intelligence, Economic Research, Political Research, and Strategic Research, the Central Reference Service, the Directorate of Operations, and the CIA Operations Center, joined the Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE in the Intelligence Community Staff Conference Room in the preliminary phase of the intelligence exercise. The discussions benefited greatly from a comprehensive outline prepared by the Chief of OCI's East Europe Branch. A summary of the discussions is at annex.

2. The time and place for Phase II remain, as scheduled, Tuesday, 25 March, from 1330-1600 in the IC Staff Conference Room, 6 E 0708.

[redacted] the NIO for USSR-EE, will chair the conference. Dr. [redacted] will brief the participants on CONTEXT and other rapid conferencing techniques which we hope to test during Phase III. As indicated in the 4 March memorandum, there is a possibility that delays in the installation of CONTEXT may require slipping Phase III to 8 April.

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[redacted]
Product Review Division

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
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ANNEX

Intelligence Exercise, Phase I

Most participants expect that there probably would be no crisis--in the strict sense of the term--immediately after Tito's death; thus, the general posture of the Agency would be to react to the developing situation.

One task already levied by the DCI would involve participation in a SNIE on the short-term prospects for Yugoslavia. OCI would do most of the drafting of that SNIE, under the direction of the NIO for USSR/EE. Aside from that OCI envisages producing a White House Spot Report essentially reporting the fact (i. e., Tito is dead) and immediate circumstances; follow-up items for the NID, NIB, and PDB; and briefings as required. Personnel within the East European Branch of OCI would be placed on stand-by for possible task force manning.

If a crisis did develop, the Chief of OCI/EE Branch probably would serve as chief of a substantive task force responsible for producing all Agency current intelligence on the crisis. Moreover, OCI expects to be called on by the NIO in the drafting of any Alert Memoranda which might be required.

Other offices in the Directorate of Intelligence would contribute inputs as determined by the chief of the task force and personnel as determined by the DDI. The Regional Analysis Division of OSR certainly would be represented on the task force. OER does not envision a need for the physical move of an analyst up to the Operations Center for a Yugoslav crisis, although, as the Chief of the Operations Center observed, an OER analyst became a vital part of the October War task force.

OPR does not envision any particular role for itself, as an office, in connection with task force production requirements, although it would be prepared to respond to requests for special assessments. The Chairman suggested that in a condition simmering just below the crisis level, OPR must be asked to set up an ongoing quantitative study similar to its past efforts on Vietnam, Sino-Soviet hostilities, and Arab-Israeli hostilities. The Assistant NIO, among others, was skeptical that overworked analysts would put up with the type of analyst polling procedures required for such studies.

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CRS' main function would be to supply biographic information on old or new members of the post-Tito leadership as requested. For requests outside normal daytime duty hours, the contact point would be the CIA Operations Center, which would then contact a CRS duty officer.

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The CIA Operations Center would in a crisis situation be making special efforts to alert the OCI/EE Branch Chief, his analyst, and the NIO Editor to major, fast-breaking developments. It would also do some "brokering" of requests for information, especially when the NIO and Assistant NIO were unavailable.

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
The NIO's role would generally be to insure the proper flow of requested information from producer to consumer, and, as mentioned previously, to supervise the preparation of a SNIE and Alert Memoranda. The Assistant NIO stressed that the NIO would not expect to get involved in intra-agency managerial problems and would be concerned with such problems in the Community only if there were "major gliches." Regarding the consumers, she agreed with the Chairman's suggestion that we were really talking about "only four or five." She would not expect that the "back-channel" traffic on this kind of problem would require the NIO to travel downtown to examine a reading file. If Brezhnev died, rather than Tito, that would be a different matter.

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The participants generally agreed with the written statements by OCI/EE Branch on CIA's expectations of the interface with the rest of the Community and with the NSC Staff:

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--NSC Staff: Keep producing offices informed of changing needs of top policy-making officers; levy requirements for special production.

The Chairman of the conference infers from the discussion that CIA components do not anticipate major problems in handling a post-Tito crisis. Indeed, the Chairman had to contrive a number of worst case hypotheses in order to provoke discussion, e.g.:

--Urgent requests for biographic information outside normal duty hours, on individuals for whom no finished report existed;

--A situation in which the differences between Bulgarian Macedonian and Yugoslav Macedonian became important;

--Situations in which vital information might be denied to an analyst because of his or her lack of clearance for exotic information.

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Two problems were raised which fall within the competence of DIA and NSA. The Chairman has notified those agencies of the problems and asked them for comments at Phase II. A third problem, cited by an OSR analyst, bears on the lack of Community access to information on US-Yugoslav bilaterals. The D/DCI/IC was briefed on this problem some time ago and intends to raise it in the final report on this exercise.

Prepared by:

[Redacted]
Product Review Division

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